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This paper analyzes the interaction between ﬁnancial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a dynamic model of
takeovers in which the ﬁnancing strategies of bidding ﬁrms and the timing and terms of takeovers are jointly determined.
In the paper, capital structure plays the role of a commitment device, and determines the outcome of the acquisition
contest. We demonstrate that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in ﬁnancing policies with endogenous leverage,
bankruptcy, and takeover terms, in which the bidder with the lowest leverage wins the takeover contest. Based on the
resulting equilibrium, the model generates a number of new predictions. In particular, the model predicts that the leverage
of the winning bidder is below the industry average and that acquirers should lever up after the takeover consummation.
The model also relates the dispersion in leverage ratios to various industry characteristics, such as cash ﬂow volatility or
bankruptcy costs.
r 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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The literature on mergers and acquisitions is extensive. Yet a number of dimensions of the merger process
still lack proper understanding. For example, while existing models provide a rich intuition as to why ﬁrms
should merge or restructure, they have not been entirely successful at explaining the relation between ﬁnancial
leverage and takeovers. Various theories relate a ﬁrm’s incentive to merge to capital structure motives basedee front matter r 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2008) 556–581 557on tax shields, wealth transfers, ﬁnancial slack, or information asymmetry. However, no theory examines the
link between capital structure and the timing and terms of takeovers or the outcome of bidding contests in
takeover deals. In this paper we propose such a theory, while incorporating traditional determinants of ﬁrms’
ﬁnancing policies such as tax shields and costly foreclosure.
A prerequisite for our analysis is a model that captures in a simple fashion the impact of ﬁnancing on
valuations. In this paper, we base our analysis on a contingent claims model in the spirit of Mello and Parsons
(1992), in which ﬁnancing policy affects ﬁrm value through its impact on taxes, bankruptcy costs, and
investment policy. While Mello and Parsons focus on internal investment, we consider instead growth via
acquisition in an environment in which several ﬁrms can compete for a target. In the paper, the ﬁnancing
strategies of the bidding ﬁrms and the timing and terms of takeovers are jointly determined. We show that
capital structure plays the role of a commitment device and determines the outcome of the acquisition contest.
Notably, we demonstrate that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in ﬁnancing policies with endogenous
leverage, bankruptcy, and takeover terms. In this equilibrium, the bidder with the lowest leverage wins the
takeover contest. The other bidders make up for the loss of the growth opportunity by issuing more debt and
receiving greater tax beneﬁts.
Based on the resulting equilibrium the model yields a number of new predictions. Speciﬁcally, the model
demonstrates that potential control transactions (and more generally potential investment opportunities)
could lead otherwise identical ﬁrms to select different ﬁnancing strategies. In addition, the model relates the
dispersion in leverage ratios to various industry characteristics such as bankruptcy costs or cash ﬂow volatility.
The model also predicts that the leverage of the winning bidder is below the industry average and that
acquirers should lever up after the takeover consummation. The predictions of the model for ﬁrm-level
ﬁnancing strategies are consistent with the available evidence on the relation between ﬁnancing and
takeovers.1 The predictions on the dispersion in industry leverage ratios are novel and provide grounds for
further empirical work on mergers and acquisitions.
While our model is speciﬁcally tailored to takeover transactions, it can be applied to any investment
opportunity available to a set of competing ﬁrms. In our asymmetric equilibrium one ﬁrm decides to have a
lower leverage ratio to receive some of the net present value of the investment opportunity. The other ﬁrm
makes up for the lost opportunity by selecting a higher debt level, which is associated with greater tax beneﬁts.
Thus, in the model two ex ante identical ﬁrms optimally choose asymmetric strategies. One becomes a growth
ﬁrm, selects a low leverage ratio, and invests. The other becomes a value ﬁrm, selects a higher leverage ratio,
and does not invest. In this equilibrium the growth ﬁrm ends up with a lower leverage ratio, which is consistent
with the available empirical evidence on ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing policies (see Smith and Watts, 1992; Rajan and
Zingales, 1995).2
The analysis in the present paper relates to several articles in the literature. Lambrecht (2004), Morellec and
Zhdanov (2005), Lambrecht and Myers (2007), Margsiri, Mello, and Ruckes (2005), and Hackbarth and
Morellec (2008) develop real options models to analyze the timing and terms of takeovers. In all of these
papers, ﬁrms are unlevered. Morellec (2004) and Leland (2007) examine the relation between the debt
structure of target ﬁrms and control transactions. Morellec (2004) considers a model in which managers of
target ﬁrms do not act in the best interests of shareholders. In his model debt serves as a defensive device to
prevent control challenges and control transactions do not arise in equilibrium. Leland (2007) abstracts from
agency conﬂicts and considers the role of purely ﬁnancial synergies in motivating mergers and acquisitions in a
model with exogenous timing.
While our model shares some characteristics with these in existing literature, it also differs from them in a
number of important dimensions. First, the present model examines the outcome of takeover contests when
both the bidding and the target ﬁrms are levered. As we show in the paper, the ﬁnancing strategies of1Bruner (1988), Ghosh and Jain (2000), and Uysal (2006) show that bidders are signiﬁcantly less levered before mergers than a control
sample of ﬁrms and that the bidders’ leverage rises signiﬁcantly after the takeover consummation. Welch (2004) reports that ‘‘ﬁrms that
have engaged in takeover activity tend to increase leverage.’’ Clayton and Ravid (2002) ﬁnd empirical support for the prediction that ﬁrms
with higher leverage are likely to lose bidding contests.
2Our results are also consistent with the evidence on leverage, product market competition, and investment. For example, Chevalier
(1995) reports that unleveraged supermarket chains are more likely to open stores where competitors have recently experienced a leveraged
buyout. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) ﬁnd that highly leveraged ﬁrms in concentrated industries are less likely to increase investment.
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the exception of Leland (2007) and Morellec (2004) in which the timing and terms of takeovers are exogenous,
the cited works do not focus on taxes, default costs, and optimal capital structure, which are central to our
analysis. Finally, unlike prior work we account for competition among bidding ﬁrms. Competition plays an
important role in shaping equilibrium ﬁnancing strategies. If there is no competition among bidders, then the
strategic role of debt disappears.
Our paper also relates to the literature that examines the relation between growth options and debt
ﬁnancing (see Myers, 1977; Barclay, Morellec, and Smith, 2006). In this literature, the cost of investment is
exogenous and ﬁrms have a monopoly access to investment projects. By contrast, our model derives the cost of
investment endogenously, as the solution to the maximization problem of target shareholders. In addition, our
model incorporates the impact of competition on the timing and terms of investment decisions and emphasizes
the role of capital structure as a commitment device in takeover contests. As shown in the paper, these
differences have important implications for equilibrium ﬁnancing strategies. Finally, our paper also
contributes to the literature that examines the relation between competition and capital structure within
contingent claims models by considering the impact of investment opportunities on ﬁnancing strategies (see
Lambrecht, 2001; Miao, 2005; Zhdanov, 2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model of takeovers is developed in
Section 2, where we also derive equilibrium ﬁnancing strategies. Section 3 extends the model to incorporate
imperfect information. Section 4 reviews the paper’s empirical implications in light of the empirical
evidence on the relation between ﬁnancing decisions and control transactions and provides concluding
remarks.
2. The model
Consider an industry with three different ﬁrms: two potential acquirers and a potential target. These roles
are exogenously assigned and are determined by ﬁrms’ speciﬁc characteristics, not modeled in this paper. Each
ﬁrm is risk-neutral and has rational expectations about the underlying stochastic processes and the decision
rules of other ﬁrms. Because of the tax beneﬁts of debt, these ﬁrms are ﬁnanced with both debt and equity.
Their choice of ﬁnancing strategy is determined by balancing the tax advantage of debt with expected
bankruptcy costs. It also reﬂects the strategic role of debt, i.e., its impact on the outcome of the takeover
contest.
The potential acquirers have identical operating technologies and their proﬁts are subject to the same
industry shock X. However, they can freely choose their ﬁnancing strategies. As shown below, potential
takeover contests lead these ﬁrms to select different leverage ratios. In the base version of the model we focus
on equity ﬁnanced cash offers. That is, we assume that the winner of the takeover contest issues new equity
and the proceeds of this issue are used to pay a cash settlement to target shareholders. In the Appendix, we
extend the model to examine stock offers.
Firms in the industry are inﬁnitely lived (ignoring default) and have assets that generate a continuous stream
of cash ﬂows. Before the takeover, the instantaneous proﬁt of bidder i is given by ð1 tÞðPi;bX  ci;bÞ, for
i ¼ 1; 2, where Pi;b40 is a constant scaling factor, ci;b is the contractual coupon payment of bidder i, and t is
the corporate tax rate. To make sure that our results are not driven by size effects we consider that
P1;b ¼ P2;b ¼ Pb. In addition, we assume that the industry shock ðXtÞtX0 is governed by the stochastic process
dXs ¼ mXs dsþ sXs dWs; X 0 ¼ x, (1)
where m and s40 are constant parameters and ðWsÞsX0 is a standard Brownian motion. This equation implies
that the growth rate of cash ﬂows is normally distributed with mean mDt and variance s2Dt over the time
interval Dt. The target’s instantaneous proﬁt is subject to the same industry shock X and is given by
ð1 tÞðPtarX  ctarÞ, where Ptar40 and ctar is the coupon payment of the target ﬁrm.
After the takeover, the new entity has to assume the debt obligations of the target. As a result, the
instantaneous proﬁt of the combined entity is given by
ð1 tÞ½PmX  ci;m, (2)
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gains that might be related to a better utilization of production facilities, a greater market power, or economies
of scale(see, e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; or Andrade and
Stafford, 2004). It is therefore natural to assume that Pm ¼ Pb þPtar þ L, where L40 represents the beneﬁts
from the acquisition. Because part of this improvement in value could come at the expense of other ﬁrms in the
industry, we assume that the losing bidder suffers a reduction in operating cash ﬂow from PbX to PoX , with
Po 2 ½Pb  L;Pb, after the takeover.3
Throughout the analysis, there exists an instantaneous risk-free rate r4m at which investors could lend
and borrow freely. In addition, we assume that ctar=ðPm PoÞoci;b=Po. This condition is satisﬁed, for
example, if the target ﬁrm chooses an optimal leverage (our base case). We also examine the case in which
ctar=ðPm PoÞ4ci;b=Po and show that it corresponds to situations in which the target is extremely leveraged.
Finally, we abstract from potential agency conﬂicts between managers and shareholders by assuming that the
incentives of these two groups are perfectly aligned (see Zwiebel, 1996; Morellec, 2004, for an analysis of the
relation between agency conﬂicts, ﬁnancing decisions, and control transactions).
2.1. Leverage and the outcome of the takeover contest
In our model shareholders make three types of interrelated decisions. First, they select the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
strategy. Second, they select the timing and terms of takeovers. Third, they select the ﬁrm’s default policy.
Assume that the takeover is consummated today. (Below we determine the timing of the takeover
endogenously.) The question we want to address is whether the capital structures of the bidding ﬁrms can help
identify the winning bidder. We solve the model using backward induction, starting with the values of
participating ﬁrms after the takeover.
At this stage we assume that ﬁrms do not change their debt levels upon the takeover consummation. This
implies that, after the takeover, shareholders’ only decision is to select the ﬁrm’s default policy. Throughout
the paper, we consider a stock-based deﬁnition of default whereby shareholders inject funds in the ﬁrm as long
as equity value is positive (as in Leland, 1994; Mello and Parsons, 1992; Morellec, 2001). This condition
implies that shareholders default on their debt obligations the ﬁrst time equity value is equal to zero. Denote
by XjðcÞ the default threshold selected by shareholders when operating cash ﬂows are given by PjX and the
ﬁrm’s coupon payment is c. In addition, let EjðX ; cÞ, j ¼ o;m, denote the value of a bidder’s equity after the
contest if he loses (j ¼ o) or wins (j ¼ m) the takeover contest. Proposition 1 speciﬁes the values of a bidder’s
equity after the takeover depending on the success of its bid. (All proofs are gathered in the Appendix).
Proposition 1. The equity value of bidder j after the takeover contest is given by
EjðX ; cÞ ¼ ð1 tÞ
PjX
r m
c
r
þ c
rð1 nÞ
X
Xj cð Þ
 !n" #
; j ¼ o;m, (3)
where the selected default threshold XjðcÞ satisfies
Xj cð Þ ¼
n
n 1
cðr mÞ
Pjr
; j ¼ o;m, (4)
and n is the negative root of the quadratic equation 1
2
s2yðy 1Þ þ my r ¼ 0.
In Eq. (3), the ﬁrst two terms in the square brackets represent the value of a perpetual entitlement to the
current ﬂow of income, given by ð1 tÞðPjX  cÞ. The last term is the value of shareholders’ option to default,
which is the product of the surplus created by this option and a stochastic discount factor, given by X nXnj .
The selected default threshold in Eq. (4) takes the usual functional form and has the following properties. The
higher the coupon payment, the lower the growth rate of the industry shock X, and the lower its volatility, the
higher the optimal default threshold. Low growth rate and low volatility of the demand shock imply a low3In our model, this reduction in cash ﬂow is not related to the bidding process itself. Instead, it is imposed on the losing bidder by a
change in the industry structure because of the restructuring. This assumption does not drive our results. Qualitatively similar conclusions
are obtained when Po ¼ Pb. Fig. 3 illustrates the impact of Po on equilibrium ﬁnancing strategies.
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discount rate is high, stockholders are more concerned about immediate losses than about potential future
proﬁts. As a result, they exercise their default option sooner.
Suppose that one ﬁrm places a bid to acquire the target. The other bidder can either place a higher bid or
lose the contest. As long as it is better off outbidding the ﬁrst bidder, the second bidder has an incentive to
place a higher bid, so that the ﬁrst bidder loses the contest and becomes the outsider. The same logic makes the
ﬁrst bidder place a new bid to outbid the second one. Bidding continues up to the point where one of the
bidders becomes better off losing the takeover contest. Call the value of the bid at that point the bidder’s
reservation value. The above argument reveals that the bidder with the lower reservation value loses the
takeover contest. As we show below, the reservation value is a function of the bidder’s leverage ratio.
Therefore, capital structure plays an important role in determining the outcome of the takeover contest.
The maximum price that a bidder is willing to pay to acquire the target follows from Proposition 1 and is
given by the difference between the equity value of the merged entity and the equity value of a losing bidder:
DEðX ; ci;bÞ ¼ ð1 tÞ
X ðPm PoÞ
r m 
ctar
r
þ X
n
rð1 nÞ
ci;b þ ctar
ðXm ci;m
 Þn  ci;bðXoðci;bÞÞn
 !" #
. (5)
Bidder i is indifferent between paying DEðX ; ci;bÞ to acquire the target or losing the takeover contest. In other
words, DEðX ; ci;bÞ is the reservation value discussed above. Because the two bidders could have different
ﬁnancing strategies, in general they are willing to offer different premiums for the acquisition transaction.
Proposition 2 establishes some key properties of the maximum price that a bidding ﬁrm is willing to pay to
acquire the target.
Proposition 2. The maximum price that a bidding firm is willing to pay to acquire the target, DEðX ; ci;bÞ,
decreases with the bidder’s contractual coupon ci;b and increases with the value of the industry shock X (the state
of the industry).
Now let c1;b and c2;b be the coupon payments of the two bidders. Furthermore, let c1;b4 c2;b. Then the Nash
equilibrium in bidding strategies is for the bidder with the higher coupon (bidder 1) to quote DEðX ; c1;bÞ and
for the other bidder to quote an offer price P4DEðX ; c1;bÞ.4 Assume that the target ﬁrm can achieve a fraction
Z 2 ½0; 1 of the difference between the reservation value of bidder 2 and the reservation value of bidder 1.5 In
equilibrium, the optimal strategy for bidder 1 is to become an outsider. Bidder 2 pays DEðX ; c1;bÞ þ
Z½DEðX ; c2;bÞ  DEðX ; c1;bÞ to target shareholders and wins the contest. This follows from the fact that if the
acquisition price is equal to DEðX ; c2;bÞ, bidder 2 is indifferent between winning the takeover contest and
becoming an outsider, and from the monotonicity of DEðX ; cÞ established in Proposition 2.
The economic intuition underlying these equilibrium bidding strategies is as follows. By acquiring the target,
bidding shareholders increase not only the value of the ﬁrm’s assets but also the value of outstanding bonds by
decreasing the probability of default. That is, part of the takeover surplus is captured by the debtholders of the
bidding ﬁrm. Because the wealth transfer between shareholders and bondholders increases with leverage, the
net beneﬁt of the control transaction to the shareholders of the bidding ﬁrm decreases with leverage. This
makes the maximum acquisition price a decreasing function of leverage. Importantly, any tender offer below
DEðX ; c1;bÞ cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy. The bidder that places this bid loses the takeover
contest, because the other ﬁrm has an incentive to outbid and win. Proposition 3 follows.
Proposition 3. When c1;b4c2;b, bidder 2 wins the takeover contest and pays a price DEðX ; c1;bÞþ
Z½DEðX ; c2;bÞ  DEðX ; c1;bÞ. Bidder 1 loses the takeover contest.4In our model, targets are scarce and competition between multiple bidders hurts the acquirer. See Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and
De, Fedenia, and Triantis (1996) for evidence supporting this view.
5When Z ¼ 0, the outcome of the takeover contest is determined through an ascending English auction. In our model, Z has two opposite
effects on the ﬁnancing strategies of bidding ﬁrms. First, for a given timing of the takeover, an increase in Z leads to a decrease in the value
of the takeover opportunity and, hence, in the dispersion of leverage ratios. Second, an increase in Z fastens the takeover process leading to
an increase in the value of the takeover opportunity. In our base case environment, the ﬁrst effect dominates, so that an increase in Z leads
to a decrease in the dispersion of leverage ratios. We thank the referee for suggesting the use of a sharing rule Z40.
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Consider next the timing of the takeover. Suppose that target shareholders have perfect information about
the industry shock and about the ﬁnancing strategies of bidding ﬁrms. The objective of target shareholders is
to maximize the acquisition premium net of the costs associated with the control transaction. In the analysis
below, we assume that target shareholders announce the minimum acquisition price I, for which they are
willing to surrender the control of their ﬁrm. Because DEðX ; cÞ increases with the value of the industry shock X
for any coupon payment c, the equilibrium takeover price DEðX ; c1;bÞ þ Z½DEðX ; c2;bÞ  DEðX ; c1;bÞ increases
with X for any pair ðc1;b; c2;bÞ. This implies that there is a unique mapping from X to I. Therefore, selecting the
selling price is equivalent to selecting the value of the industry shock at which the transaction occurs and hence
the timing of the takeover. In particular, because of the monotonicity of DEðX ; cÞ, the takeover contest takes
place the ﬁrst time that X reaches the threshold X , determined by the following condition:
X : DEðX ; c1;bÞ þ Z½DEðX ; c2;bÞ  DEðX ; c1;bÞ ¼ I ; Z 2 ½0; 1. (6)
Once the threshold X is reached, bidder 2 acquires the target by paying I. Bidder 1 has no incentive to outbid
and therefore loses the takeover contest and becomes an outsider. As long as Eq. (6) holds, selecting the
threshold X is equivalent to selecting the selling price I. Thereafter, we thus assume that target shareholders
choose the takeover threshold X to maximize the value of their claims.
Takeovers typically impose costs on target shareholders (related, for example, to the loss of private beneﬁts
of control). In the analysis below, we consider that target shareholders bear a cost K at the time of the
takeover. When choosing the selling price of their ﬁrm, target shareholders seek to maximize the present value
of the takeover premium net of the costs associated with the control transaction. In our model, these costs
include not only the direct cost K but also the opportunity cost of waiting associated with the possibility of
foreclosure. Speciﬁcally, because the bidding and target ﬁrms are partially ﬁnanced with risky debt, one of
these ﬁrms could go bankrupt before a takeover occurs. In the following analysis, we assume that antitrust
authorities would then prevent the two remaining ﬁrms from merging and forming a monopoly.6 Therefore, if
one of the bidding ﬁrms forecloses, no takeover is feasible. This imposes an additional cost of waiting on
target shareholders.
Denote by X 1, X 2, and X tar the default thresholds selected by bidder 1, bidder 2, and the target ﬁrm,
respectively. Because no takeover is feasible if either one of the bidding ﬁrms or the target ﬁrm defaults on its
debt obligations, a takeover can occur only if the industry shock reaches the takeover threshold X before
reaching the highest of the three default thresholds X 1, X 2, and X tar. Because bidding ﬁrms have the same cash
ﬂow structure and c1;b4c2;b, it must be that X 14X 2. In addition, we also know that the decision to default
balances the value of equity in continuation (which is higher for the target ﬁrm because of the beneﬁts of the
takeover) with the value of equity in default (which is the same for both ﬁrms). As a result, it must also be that
X 14X tar. The above reasoning implies that takeovers arise only if X reaches X before reaching X 1.
Assume that X 0 2 ðX 1;X Þ. Denote by LðX ; z; yÞ the present value of $1 to be received the ﬁrst time X
reaches the lower threshold z, conditional on X reaching z before reaching the upper threshold y. In addition,
denote by HðX ; z; yÞ the present value of one dollar to be received the ﬁrst time that the industry shock X
reaches the higher threshold y, conditional on X reaching y before the lower threshold z. We then have
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The value-maximizing strategy for target shareholders is to sell their firm at the price
I ¼ ð1 ZÞDEðX ; c1;bÞ þ ZDEðX ; c2;bÞ, where the takeover threshold X is the solution to the following
maximization problem:
X ¼ arg max
y
ð1 tÞLðX ;X 1; yÞ
X 1
X tar
 n
ctar
rð1 nÞ þHðX ;X 1; yÞF ðyÞ
 
, (7)6Even if the antitrust authorities do not preclude the takeover, the foreclosure of a given bidder reduces competition for the target ﬁrm.
This lowers the acquisition premium accrued to the target and makes the takeover less attractive from the target’s perspective.
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F ðyÞ ¼ ð1 ZÞDEðy; c1;bÞ þ ZDEðy; c2;bÞ  K þ ð1 tÞ
Ptary
r m 
ctar
r
  	
. (8)
In this equation, X 1 is the default threshold selected by the shareholders of the unsuccessful bidding firm (firm 1),
X tar is the default threshold selected by target shareholders defined by
X tar ¼
n
n 1
ctarðr mÞ
Ptarr
, (9)
and the quantities LðX ; z; yÞ and HðX ; z; yÞ are defined by
LðX ; z; yÞ ¼ ðyxX n  ynX xÞðyxzn  ynzxÞ1, (10)
HðX ; z; yÞ ¼ ðX xzn  X nzxÞðyxzn  ynzxÞ1, (11)
where x and n are, respectively, the positive and negative roots of the quadratic equation 1
2
s2y
ðy 1Þ þ my r ¼ 0. Under this strategy, the takeover occurs the first time the industry shock reaches X ,
conditional on X reaching X before X 1.
The objective function in Eq. (7) has two components. The ﬁrst term in the curly brackets accounts for the
impact of the takeover threshold on the option to default of target shareholders. This option to default is the
product of two terms: the payoff of the option in default (ð1 tÞctar=½rð1 nÞ) and a stochastic discount factor
(LðX ;X 1;X ÞX n1Xntar) that represents the present value of $1 to be received at the time of default. Importantly,
once bidder 1 has defaulted, takeovers are precluded and the default threshold selected by target shareholders
takes the usual functional form given by Eq. (9). The second term in the objective function can be decomposed
as the takeover premium net of the control cost multiplied by an appropriate discount factor, given by
Eq. (11). Proposition 5 establishes the existence of the solution to the maximization problem Eq. (7).
Proposition 5. For sufficiently large values of K , there exists a unique solution to the maximization problem of
target shareholders defined in equation (7).
Fig. 1 represents the takeover trigger X that determines the selling price of the target ﬁrm as a function of
the control cost K. In this ﬁgure, we consider that the abandonment value of the ﬁrm, denoted by AjðX Þ, is
equal to the unlevered value of the ﬁrm’s assets, net of a proportional default costs a (a similar speciﬁcation isFig. 1. Optimal takeover threshold. The ﬁgure plots the selected takeover threshold X as a function of the control cost, K. Parameter
values are set as in the base case environment. The solid, dashed, and dotted lines correspond to the following values of the coupon
payment: ci;b ¼ 0:1, 0:6, and 1:0:
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AjðX Þ ¼ ð1 aÞð1 tÞ
PjX
r m ; for j ¼ b; o;m. (12)
In addition, we use the following input parameter values: r ¼ 0:06, m ¼ 0:01, s ¼ 0:25, L=ðPi;b þPtarÞ ¼ 0:10,
t ¼ 0:15, Z ¼ 0:5, and a ¼ 0:4. The risk-free rate is taken from the yield curve on Treasury bonds. The growth
rate of cash ﬂows has been selected to generate a dividend yield consistent with observed yields (see Ibbotson
Associates, 2002). Similarly, the value of the volatility parameter has been chosen to match the (leverage-
adjusted) asset return volatility of an average Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 ﬁrm’s (see Strebulaev, 2007).
The tax advantage of debt captures corporate and personal taxes and is set equal to t ¼ 0:15. Liquidation
costs are deﬁned as the ﬁrm’s going concern value minus its liquidation value, divided by its going concern
value (measured by 1 a in our model). Using this deﬁnition, Alderson and Betker (1995) and Gilson (1997),
respectively, report liquidation costs equal to 36.5% and 45.5% for the median ﬁrm in their samples. Finally,
Healey, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) show a 14% increase in the cash ﬂows of the merged ﬁrms in their sample
in the ﬁrst year following a merger.
Fig. 1 reveals that the takeover threshold increases with the control cost K . As K gets larger, target
shareholders postpone the takeover, until the takeover premium is sufﬁciently high to compensate for the cost
of the takeover. Fig. 1 also shows that the takeover threshold increases with the coupon payment of bidder 1.
In the present model, an increase in the coupon payment of bidder 1 reduces the equilibrium acquisition
premium, leading to an increase in the option value of waiting for target shareholders. It also implies a higher
probability of foreclosure, thereby providing an incentive for target shareholders to speed up the takeover.
Fig. 1 shows that ﬁrst effect dominates in the base case environment.2.3. Equilibrium financing strategies
In this subsection, we examine the impact of the takeover contest on the equilibrium ﬁnancing policies of
bidding ﬁrms. We assume that ﬁrms select their coupon payments at time 0 and that debtholders have full
information and rational expectations about the outcome of the takeover contest. This implies that they can
assess the impact of debt ﬁnancing on the timing and terms of the takeover. This also implies that they are able
to identify the winner of the takeover contest, based on the debt levels of the ﬁrms in the industry. In
equilibrium, they price their claims accordingly.
Assume that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in leverage strategies and that the two bidders set their
coupons equal to c1;b and c2;b with c1;b4c2;b. As established in Proposition 2, the ﬁrm with the lower coupon
(bidder 2) then acquires the target. Prior to the takeover, the debt contract of the losing bidder (bidder 1)
delivers a cash ﬂow c1;b and its equity contract delivers a cash ﬂow ð1 tÞ½PbX  c1;b. The debt and equity
values of bidder 1 can then be characterized as in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. The debt and equity values of bidder 1 before the takeover satisfy:
D1;bðX Þ ¼
c1;b
r
þLðX ;X ;X 1Þ AbðX 1Þ 
c1;b
r
h i
þHðX ;X 1;X Þ
X
Xo
 n
AoðXoÞ 
c1;b
r
h i
(13)
and
E1;bðX Þ ¼ ð1 tÞ
PbX
r m
c1;b
r
þHðX ;X 1;X Þ
ðPo PbÞX
r m
 	
þ ð1 tÞ LðX ;X ;X 1Þ
c1;b
r
PbX 1
r m
 
þHðX ;X 1;X Þ
X
Xo
 n
c1;b
rð1 nÞ
 	
,
ð14Þ
where LðX ; z; yÞ and HðX ; z; yÞ are defined in Eqs. (10) and (11), X 1 is the default threshold of bidder 1, and AjðxÞ
is the abandonment value of the firm’s assets.
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the square brackets represent the present value of a perpetual entitlement to the current ﬂow of income
(ignoring the options available to the ﬁrm) assuming that the ﬁrm operates forever within the same industry
structure. The third term in the square brackets represents the change in the value of equity resulting from a
potential control transaction. Finally, the last term on the right-hand side of Eq. (14) represents the value of
the option to default. In our model, this option value has two components because default can occur either
before or after the takeover. The value of debt in Proposition 6 has two components: the value of perpetual
coupon payments and the expected loss net of recovery value realized in the event of default (which depends
on whether a takeover occurs before or after default).
The next step in identifying equilibrium ﬁnancing strategies is to determine the value of bidder 2’s securities
as a function of its coupon payment under the assumption that bidder 2 takes the ﬁnancing and default
strategies of bidder 1 and the corresponding takeover timing as given. These values are given in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. The debt and equity values of bidder 2 before the takeover are given by
D2;bðX Þ ¼
c2;b
r
þLðX ;X 1;X Þ
X 1
X 2
 n
AbðX 2Þ 
c2;b
r
h i
þHðX ;X 1;X Þ
X
Xm
 n
c2;b
c2;b þ ctar
AmðXmÞ 
c2;b
r
 	
(15)
and
E2;bðX Þ ¼ ð1 tÞ
PbX
r m
c2;b
r
þLðX ;X 1;X Þ
c2;b
rð1 nÞ
X 1
X 2
 n 	
þHðX ;X 1;X Þ ð1 tÞ
Ptar þ L
r m X 
ctar
r
þ c2;m
rð1 nÞ
X
Xm
 n 	
 I
 
, ð16Þ
where c2;m ¼ c2;b þ ctar, AjðxÞ is the abandonment value of the firm, and X 2 and Xm are the equity value-
maximizing default thresholds of bidder 2 before and after the takeover, respectively:
X 2 ¼
n
n 1
c2;bðr mÞ
Pbr
and Xm ¼
n
n 1
c2;mðr mÞ
Pmr
. (17)
Proposition 7 shows that equity value of the winning bidder has three components. The ﬁrst two terms in
the square brackets represent the expected present value of the cash ﬂows accruing to shareholders if the ﬁrm
operates forever within the same industry structure and the value of the option to default before the takeover
(last term in the square brackets). The last term represents the change in the present value of cash ﬂows
following a control transaction. In this expression, the change in the value of equity resulting from a potential
control transaction is multiplied by a stochastic discount factorHðX ;X 1;X Þ. This stochastic discount factor
represents the value of $1 to be received at the time of the takeover and captures the state-contingent nature of
the model. The value of debt in Proposition 7 has two components: the value of perpetual coupon payments
and the expected loss net of recovery value realized in the event of default. Following a control transaction,
shareholders of the acquiring ﬁrm assume the debt obligations of the target. In the event of foreclosure, the
ﬁrm defaults on both debt contracts. Assuming equal seniority, debtholders split the abandonment value of
the ﬁrm on a pro rata basis.
In equilibrium, the takeover and default thresholds X and X 1 as well as the coupon payments c1;b and c2;b
are endogenous. Given any triple ðX 1,c1;b; c2;bÞ, target shareholders select the timing of the takeover
(by choosing the selling price I) to maximize the expected discounted takeover premium net of the control
costs. Given X , shareholders of the losing bidder (bidder 1) select their ﬁnancing policy c1;b and the default
threshold X 1 to maximize the value of their claims.
The ﬁnal element in the equilibrium is the coupon payment of bidder 2, c2;b. When selecting their ﬁnancial
strategy, shareholders seek to maximize the sum of equity value after debt has been issued and the proceeds
from debt issue. However, because of the impact of ﬁnancing on the outcome of the takeover contest, bidder 2
cannot formulate its ﬁnancing strategy in isolation, without regard to the potential impact on the other
bidder’s ﬁnancing strategy. First, if c2;b4c1;b, the roles of the two ﬁrms switches and bidder 2 loses its strategic
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leverage, it must be that the beneﬁts of leverage for the two ﬁrms coincide. In particular, if bidder 2 selected a
coupon that allowed it to reach a value higher than that of bidder 1, the latter would have an incentive to issue
debt with a coupon just marginally below that of bidder 2. The incentive to undercut bidder 2 in leverage
disappears once the total beneﬁts of debt ﬁnancing are the same for the two bidders. Bidder 2 enjoys the
beneﬁt of winning the takeover contest. But at the same time, it does not fully utilize the tax beneﬁts of debt.
At the equilibrium point, the increase in value stemming from takeover is fully offset by the lower tax shields
resulting from the lower leverage ratio.
The two bidders never choose the same leverage ratio in equilibrium. In such a scenario, the stockholders of
a bidding ﬁrm would be indifferent ex-post between acquiring the target and losing the takeover contest
(all the beneﬁts of the takeover accrue to the target). However, at the time of the debt issue, the value of
corporate debt is affected by the future outcome of the takeover contest. In particular, if a ﬁrm can commit to
win the contest, the total value of its securities increases because operational performance improves following
the takeover (leading to lower probability of default and to higher debt values). In our model the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing strategy plays the role of such a commitment device. As long as the total value of bidder 2
(the winner) is above that of bidder 1, the two ﬁrms have an incentive to undercut each other in leverage.
Therefore in a symmetric equilibrium both ﬁrms must have zero leverage. But as long as the corporate tax rate
t is positive, a bidder always has an incentive to issue debt. Therefore, no symmetric equilibrium exists. The
logic of the equilibrium is formalized by the Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. The equilibrium values of the acquisition and default thresholds X and X 1 maximize the objective
function in the optimization problem of target shareholders given in Eq. (7) and the value of the shares of bidder 1
given in Eq. (14). In addition, the coupon payments c1;b and c

2;b are jointly determined by the following system of
equations:
c1;b ¼ arg max½E1;bðX ; c1;bÞ þD1;bðX ; c1;bÞ (18)
and
v1;bðX ; c1;bÞ  E1;bðX ; 0Þ ¼ v2;bðX ; c2;bÞ  E2;bðX ; 0Þ, (19)
where vi;bðX ; ci;bÞ ¼ Ei;bðX ; ci;bÞ þDi;bðX ; ci;bÞ is the value of bidder i for a given industry shock X and a given
coupon payment ci;b.
Fig. 2 presents the total value of bidder 2 as a function of its coupon payment in our base case environment.
The values displayed in Fig. 2 are conditional on the assumption that bidder 2 wins the takeover contest and
bidder 1 does not attempt to undercut bidder 2 in leverage. The maximum feasible value of bidder 1 is shown
for reference purposes. In this ﬁgure, value functions are deﬁned for c2;boc1;b ¼ 0:49.
Fig. 2 shows that the equilibrium coupon of the winning bidder, c2;b, is equal to 0.21 in the base case
environment. For any c2;bo0:21, the value of bidder 1 exceeds that of bidder 2. Hence, bidder 2 has an
incentive to raise its coupon payment. By doing so, it is able to increase the total value of its securities without
bringing about any strategic implications on the part of bidder 1. Therefore, any value of c2;b below 0:21
cannot be the equilibrium coupon payment. Likewise, any c2;b40:21 cannot be the equilibrium coupon
payment, as in this region bidder 1 always has an incentive to undercut bidder 2 in leverage to win the contest
and increase its value. Thus, c2;b ¼ 0:21 is the equilibrium coupon of bidder 2. If bidder 2 could win the
takeover contest regardless of its ﬁnancing strategy (or if it was the only bidder), then its coupon payment
would be 0.61. It follows that the strategic role of debt reduces the selected coupon payment by more
than 65%.
This analysis shows that, because of the impact of debt ﬁnancing on the outcome of takeover contests, a
ﬁrm selects a leverage ratio that is substantially lower than the leverage ratio implied by models of capital
structure in which investment policy is ﬁxed. The model also helps explain why otherwise identical ﬁrms could
choose to have very different leverage ratios. In our asymmetric equilibrium one ﬁrm decides to have a lower
leverage ratio to receive some of the NPV of the investment (takeover) opportunity. The other ﬁrm makes up
for the loss of the growth opportunity by selecting a higher debt level and thus by getting greater tax beneﬁts.
Therefore, in this model two ex-ante identical ﬁrms optimally choose asymmetric strategies. One becomes a
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Fig. 2. Values of the bidding ﬁrms. The ﬁgure plots the value of the losing bidder (bidder 1, solid line) and the value of the winning bidder
(bidder 2, dashed line) as the coupon of bidder 2 varies. Parameter values are set as in the base case environment.
E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2008) 556–581566growth ﬁrm, selects a low leverage ratio, and invests. The other becomes a value ﬁrm, selects a higher leverage
ratio, and does not invest.
To get more insights into the determinants of ﬁnancing policies, Fig. 3 plots the ﬁrms’ leverage ratios for
different values of the synergy beneﬁts L, the volatility parameter s, bankruptcy costs a, corporate taxes t, the
value of the industry shock X, and the operating cash ﬂows of the losing bidder Po. As shown by the
ﬁgure, the leverage ratio of the winning bidder (bidder 2) is substantially lower than that of the losing bidder
(bidder 1). The ﬁgure also illustrates four predictions of the model.
First, the leverage ratio of bidder 2 decreases with L and increases with Po. An increase in synergy beneﬁts
speeds up the takeover and therefore increases its strategic impact on the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing strategies. This
increases the takeover surplus and the leverage spread. By contrast, an increase in Po reduces the cost of being
the losing bidder and, hence, the leverage spread. Second, the optimal leverage ratios of both bidders decrease
with volatility. An increase in volatility leads to an increase in the probability of default and thus in the cost of
debt. In addition, since the value of the real option to do a takeover increases with volatility, so does the
leverage gap between bidding ﬁrms. Third, the spread in leverage ratios increases with the value of the industry
shock X. In other words, as the beneﬁts associated with the takeover increase, the likelihood of a takeover
increases and the strategic role of debt becomes more important. Fourth, the asymmetry in ﬁnancing policies
is greater in industries with low bankruptcy costs. Speciﬁcally, a decrease in bankruptcy costs leads to an
increase in the beneﬁts of the takeover and, therefore, to a greater asymmetry in leverage.2.3.1. Adjusting leverage after the takeover
Suppose now that ﬁrms can change their ﬁnancing policy immediately after the takeover.7 This timing for
the capital structure rebalancing is not arbitrary. Once the takeover has taken place, debt loses its strategic
role. Therefore the merged entity will naturally want to adjust its leverage ratio based on pure ‘‘tax beneﬁts7For the sake of tractability and analytical transparency, we assume as in other papers on capital structure and competition (e.g.,
Lambrecht, 2001; Miao, 2005) that the ﬁrm cannot change its coupon payment before the takeover. Relaxing this assumption and
introducing dynamic capital structure strategies would present an interesting yet technically challenging extension. In that case analytical
solution would be precluded, as one would have to ﬁnd a ﬁxed point in an inﬁnite dimensional space to solve for the equilibrium. We
believe that the static framework is realistic because of the transactions costs associated with issuing and retiring debt (in standard
contingent claims models adjustments in debt policy are infrequent). The lower leveraged bidder still is able to offer a higher takeover
premium, and the results are qualitatively similar to the static case. For dynamic capital structure strategies in a single ﬁrm framework, see,
for example, Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Strebulaev (2007), or Hackbarth, Miao, and
Morellec (2006).
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium leverage ratios. The ﬁgure illustrates the impact of the synergy parameter L, the volatility parameter s, bankruptcy
costs a, corporate taxes t, the operating cash ﬂow of the losing bidder Po, and the initial state of the stochastic shock x0 on equilibrium
leverage ratios. The solid line represents the leverage ratio of bidder 2, and the dashed line represents the leverage ratio of bidder 1.
Parameter values are set as in the base case environment.
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Fig. 4. Equilibrium leverage ratios of the bidders with debt restructuring. The ﬁgure plots the equilibrium initial leverage ratios of the
bidders as functions of control cost, K, when debt restructuring is allowed immediately upon takeover consummation. The solid line
represents the leverage ratio of bidder 2, and the dashed line represents the leverage ratio of bidder 1.
E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2008) 556–581568versus expected default costs’’ considerations. The new coupon c2;m is set to maximize the total value of equity
at the time of restructuring, given by the value of new debt plus the ex-post value of equity:
c2;m ¼ arg max
c
½DD2;mðX ; c c2;mÞ þ E2;mðX ; cÞ. (20)
In this equation, DD2;mðX ; c c2;mÞ is the value of new debt issued by the merged entity. In equilibrium,
claimholders take into account the implications of a change in leverage at the time of the takeover and adjust
the price of their claims accordingly.
Fig. 4 plots the leverage ratios of the bidders as the control cost K varies. Fig. 4 shows that allowing ﬁrms to
change their leverage ratios after the takeover makes the equilibrium even more asymmetric. For example, for
K ¼ 4 the ratio of bidder 1’s to bidder 2’s leverage is 3.23, while in the static coupon case this ratio is equal to
1.81. This difference is a result of the value of the option to adjust leverage, which introduces an additional
asymmetry in values in favor of the winning bidder. Debt loses its strategic role after the takeover contest and
the merged entity has an incentive to lever up.2.3.2. Acquiring a highly levered target
Suppose now that the target ﬁrm is highly levered relative to the bidder so that ctarPo4ci;bðPm PoÞ. For
these transactions, a wealth transfer should take place from the claimholders of the bidding ﬁrm to target
debtholders. That is, the target’s debt becomes less risky and its value increases. At the same time, the bidder’s
debt becomes more risky and its value goes down. These effects imply that for such deals the acquisition
premium increases with the leverage ratio of the bidding ﬁrm, so that the bidder with the higher leverage wins
the takeover contest. In other words, equityholders expropriate existing bondholders by increasing the
riskiness of their claims.
Importantly, we can still observe an asymmetric equilibrium in ﬁnancing strategies when the target
ﬁrm is highly levered. In this equilibrium, the bidder with the higher leverage wins the takeover contest.
As a result, the value of its debt goes down. However, this bidder compensates the reduction in debt
values by a greater tax beneﬁt. By contrast, the bidder with the lower leverage loses the takeover contest
and therefore has a more favorably priced debt, but it receives lower tax beneﬁts. A symmetric equilibrium
is still not feasible as long as there are tax beneﬁts of debt. If competing bidders have the same coupon,
then each of them has an incentive to marginally decrease its coupon so as to increase the (ex ante) value of
its debt.
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Fig. 5. Values of the bidding ﬁrms. The ﬁgure presents the values of the losing bidder (bidder 2) and the winning one (bidder 1) as
functions of the coupon payment of bidder 2 in acquisitions involving highly levered targets. The equilibrium pair of coupon payments
ðc1; c2Þ ¼ ð0:46; 0:36Þ. The solid line represents the total value of bidder 1, and the dotted line represents the total value of bidder 2.
Parameter values are set as in the base case environment.
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bidder 2 varies, under the assumption that bidder 2 accepts the role of the losing bidder. In this ﬁgure, the
leverage ratio of the target ﬁrm is 84%. Fig. 5 shows that, in this environment, the equilibrium coupon
payment of bidder 2 (losing bidder) is 0.36, while that of bidder 1 (winning bidder) is 0.46. The corresponding
leverage ratios are 37% and 46%. While the unconditional value-maximizing leverage ratio of bidder 2 is
46%, it is constrained to use less debt.
The above analysis shows that if there are no synergies, no spillover effect, and no coinsurance, then
the acquisition premium increases with the leverage of the bidder as long as the bidder’s leverage is below the
target’s one. Synergy gains lead to an increase in proﬁtability and, hence, to an increase in the value of
the bidder’s debt. Coinsurance works in the same direction. Therefore even for considerably levered targets,
the takeover transaction could still lead to an increase in the value of the bidder’s debt so that the acquisition
premium decreases in the bidder’s leverage ratio.
Furthermore, because shareholders bear ex ante the cost of such leverage-increasing transactions, debt
covenants would likely prohibit these transactions unless approved by current debtholders. For example,
Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2005) report that over the period 2000–2003, 90% of bond issues included
covenants restricting the ﬁrm’s ability to merge. Some of these bond issues allow mergers only if the net
tangible assets of the ﬁrm, calculated on a post-merger basis, are at least a certain fraction of long-term debt.
Such covenants would preclude acquisitions of highly levered targets and hence would prevent wealth
transfers from bidding to target debtholders. As a result, we expect that such asymmetric equilibria in
ﬁnancing strategies would be precluded either because of bond covenants or because of merger synergies or
coinsurance effects.3. Imperfect information
In this section, we incorporate imperfect information into the model to show that the leverage spread should
be related to the availability of information about merger synergies. Speciﬁcally, we consider an environment
in which both bidders believe that the synergy beneﬁt of the other bidder is uniformly distributed on the
interval ½Li  ;Li þ , where i ¼ 1; 2 and 40. Thus, while bidder i knows the value of its synergy parameter
Li with certainty, this value is not available to bidder j, who has information only about its distribution and
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the synergy parameter of bidder i coincides with its true value Li.
Because the true synergy beneﬁts are both equal to Li, the bidder with the lower coupon wins the takeover
contest, as in the case of perfect information. This is because no bidder has an incentive to raise its bid above
the reservation value DEðX ; ci;bÞ given by Eq. (5), and DEðX ; ci;bÞ is a decreasing function of ci;b, as established
by Proposition 2. Even though at the start of the auction there is imperfect information regarding the synergy
beneﬁts, information about these synergy beneﬁts is revealed during the bidding process. In particular, once a
bidder leaves the takeover contest, its synergy parameter becomes known to the other bidder with certainty.
That is, uncertainty is resolved through the bidding process.
At the time of debt issuance, the outcome of the takeover contest and the timing and terms of the takeover
are uncertain, because the synergy proﬁts are not known with certainty. Because of its impact on valuations,
this uncertainty regarding the potential beneﬁts of the takeover could also affect equilibrium ﬁnancing
strategies. Speciﬁcally, suppose that bidder 2’s coupon is c2;b. Then the best response of bidder 1 is to select the
coupon payment c1;bðc2;bÞ that maximizes the following quantity:
V1;bðc1;b; c2;bÞ ¼ EL½E1;iðc1;b; c2;b;LÞ þD1;iðc1;b; c2;b;LÞ, (21)
where i ¼ o (respectively, i ¼ m) if bidder 1 loses (respectively, wins) the takeover contest.
One essential difference between an environment with imperfect information and one with perfect
information is that setting a coupon payment marginally below the coupon payment of the rival does not
guarantee winning the takeover contest (as was the case with perfect information). Instead, it increases the
probability of winning. Therefore, the marginal beneﬁts of reducing the contractual coupon payment come in
the form of the higher probability of winning the contest and lower expected bankruptcy costs, while the
marginal costs are represented by the reduced tax savings.
When selecting their ﬁnancing strategy, bidding shareholders trade off the marginal beneﬁts of debt against
its marginal costs. The nature of this trade-off depends on the magnitude of the uncertainty regarding synergy
beneﬁts. If there is little uncertainty, the beneﬁts arising from the higher probability of winning the contest
exceed the reduction in tax beneﬁts. Therefore, bidding shareholders would like to reduce their coupon to the
point where the subjective probability of winning is one. Fig. 6, Panel A, illustrates this logic by providing the
best response function of both bidders when  ¼ 0:01.
Fig. 6, Panel A, shows that when there is little uncertainty regarding the magnitude of synergy beneﬁts, the
best response curves of bidder 1 and bidder 2 do not intersect. Thus, whatever coupon payment a bidderFig. 6. Best response curves. The ﬁgure plots the optimal coupon of bidder 1 as a function of bidder 2’s coupon for the case of imperfect
information. Parameter values are set as in the base case environment. In addition, the dispersion of the market beliefs about the synergy is
 ¼ 0:01 in Panel A and  ¼ 0:1 in Panel B.
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equilibrium as in the perfect information case. In this equilibrium one bidder selects a relatively high coupon
payments, enjoys greater tax beneﬁts, and is likely to lose the takeover contest. The other bidder chooses
a low coupon and is likely to win the takeover contest. Also, consistent with the intuition discussed above
it is not optimal to marginally undercut one’s rival in leverage. For example, when the coupon payment of
bidder 2 is c2;b ¼ 0:4, the best response of bidder 1 is not to set its coupon to 0:4  (which is the optimal
strategy in the perfect information case), but to set it instead to 0:35 to increase the probability of winning
the contest.
When uncertainty is substantial, the asymmetric equilibrium falls apart. If a bidder has imprecise knowledge
about the surplus parameter of the other bidder, then it becomes optimal to raise its coupon to a high level and
increase tax beneﬁts. If uncertainty is high, each bidder can predict the outcome of the takeover contest with
only a low degree of accuracy. Therefore, the strategic role of debt becomes muted and the usual trade-off
between tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs produces a dominant effect on leverage choices. This logic is
illustrated in Fig. 6, Panel B, which provides bidders’ best response curves for the same set of parameters as
Fig. 6, Panel A, with  ¼ 0:1.
It follows from Panel B that the best response curves of the two bidders intersect at the point
ðc1;b; c2;bÞ ¼ ð0:52; 0:52Þ. Thus, the equilibrium is now symmetric and the pair of equilibrium ﬁnancing
strategies is ðc1;b; c2;bÞ ¼ ð0:52; 0:52Þ. If a bidder has imprecise knowledge about the synergy parameter of the
other bidder, then it becomes unlikely that changing capital structure helps this bidder win the takeover
contest. If the synergy proﬁt parameter of the other bidder is considerably higher than its own synergy proﬁt
parameter, then the ﬁrst bidder loses the takeover contest regardless of its capital structure. Thus the best
strategy is to select the coupon payment that best balances tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs. Likewise, if the
synergy parameter of bidder 2 is considerably lower than that of bidder 1, then bidder 1 is likely to win, no
matter how much debt it issues.
If the synergy parameter of bidder i is more uncertain than that of bidder j and if the spread is sufﬁciently
large, then the value of bidder i can exceed the value of bidder j (even whenPi;b ¼ Pj;b). Suppose, for example,
that the synergy parameter of bidder 1 is L ¼ 0:2 and is known with certainty to both players. By contrast,
bidder 1 does not know the synergy parameter of bidder 2 and believes that it is uniformly distributed on the
interval ½0:1; 0:3 (as in Fig. 6, Panel B). Then the optimal coupon of bidder 2 is 0:52 l, where l is arbitrarily
small. By setting its coupon at this value, bidder 2 wins the takeover contest. However, the high degree of
uncertainty prevents the shareholders of bidder 1 from realizing that they will lose the takeover contest and
forces them to set their coupon at 0:52. Therefore a bidder has an incentive not to disclose its synergy
parameter to a competing bidder, while trying to obtain speciﬁc information about the synergy value of
its rival.
4. Empirical implications and conclusions
We begin this ﬁnal section by reviewing the paper’s empirical implications in light of the empirical evidence
on the relation between ﬁnancing decisions and control transactions.
4.1. Empirical implications
Our model allows us to make a number of predictions on the relation between capital structure and the
timing and terms of control transactions. In particular our model predicts that the bidder with the lower
leverage is likely to win in a takeover contest and that the premium paid to the target should decrease with the
leverage of the winning bidder (as long as Z, the share of the surplus captured by target shareholders, is
positive). The model also predicts that the winner of the takeover contest should lever up after the takeover
consummation.
Using a sample of mergers from 1963 to 1979, Bruner (1988) shows that, before the merger, bidders are
signiﬁcantly less levered than a control sample of ﬁrms. Bruner also reports that, within the ﬁrst year of merger
consummation, the bidders’ leverage rises signiﬁcantly when compared with a control sample. Ghosh and Jain
(2000) reach a similar conclusion using a sample of 239 mergers completed between 1978 and 1987. Welch
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this is the second best proxy (after stock returns) for explaining debt ratio changes for Compustat ﬁrms.
Clayton and Ravid (2002) ﬁnd empirical support for the prediction that ﬁrms with higher leverage are likely to
lose bidding contests.
In a more recent study, Uysal (2006) provides direct evidence supporting our results. His source for
identifying control transactions is the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) US Mergers & Acquisitions
database. Using a sample of 998 takeover attempts between 1986 and 2001, and a two-step estimation
procedure, Uysal examines whether a bidder’s leverage deﬁcit (deﬁned as the difference between a ﬁrm’s target
leverage and its current leverage ratio) affects the premium paid by the bidder and the likelihood of the offer
success. Speciﬁcally, he ﬁrst estimates the target leverage ratio. For every year, ﬁrms in the bottom quartile
leverage deﬁcits are then deﬁned as underleveraged. In a second stage, he ﬁnds that underleveraged ﬁrms pay
higher premiums than other bidders and are more likely to successfully acquire targets.8 In addition, leverage
deﬁcit, deﬁned as actual leverage minus the target leverage, subsumes other factors such as cash slack and
current debt that had been found to be important predictors of the premium paid to the target. Uysal also
ﬁnds that the book leverage ratio of underleveraged bidders increases by 10% following the acquisition.
In Appendix B we report some additional empirical tests that provide further support for these predictions of
the model.
While some evidence exists that ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions depend on ﬁrm or industry characteristics,
relatively little work relates these factors to the dispersion of industry leverage ratios. Our model predicts that
intra-industry variation in ﬁnancial structure relates to industry factors and that real and ﬁnancial decisions
should be jointly determined.
In particular, our model helps explain why otherwise identical ﬁrms could choose to have different leverage
ratios. In our asymmetric equilibrium one ﬁrm decides to have a lower leverage ratio to receive some of the
NPV of the investment opportunity. The other ﬁrm makes up for the loss of the growth opportunity by
selecting a higher debt level, which is associated with greater tax beneﬁts. Thus, in the model two ex ante
identical ﬁrms optimally choose asymmetric strategies. One becomes a growth ﬁrm, selects a low leverage
ratio, and invests. The other becomes a value ﬁrm, selects a higher leverage ratio, and does not invest. In this
equilibrium the growth ﬁrm ends up with a lower leverage ratio.
This prediction of the model is consistent with the negative relation between market leverage (measured as
the value of debt divided by the market value of the ﬁrm) and growth options shown in the literature
examining the relation between ﬁrms’ leverage choices and the composition of their investment opportunity
sets. For example, Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) show that industries associated with high growth
opportunities tend to have low market leverage. Smith and Watts (1992) and Barclay, Morellec, and Smith
(2006) show using Compustat data a negative relation between market leverage and the market-to-book ratio,
a commonly used proxy for growth options. Rajan and Zingales (1995) extend this analysis to show that the
relation between market leverage and the market-to-book ratio is negative and signiﬁcant across seven
different countries.
Our results are also consistent with the evidence on leverage, product market competition, and investment.
For example, Chevalier (1995) reports that unleveraged supermarket chains are more likely to open
stores where competitors have recently experienced a leverage buyout. Using plant level data, Kovenock
and Phillips (1997) ﬁnd that highly leveraged ﬁrms in concentrated industries are less likely to increase
investment.
Our model also relates the intra-industry variation in ﬁnancial structure to industry factors. Notably, we
predict that the dispersion in industry leverage ratios should be positively related to the state of the industry.
To test this prediction of the model, we examine in Fig. 7 the drift of the leverage deﬁcit within a ﬁve year
window around the takeover announcement. Our source for identifying control transactions is the SDC US
Mergers & Acquisitions database. We apply a number of ﬁlters described in Appendix B to a preliminary
sample that begins on January 1, 1980 and ends on December 31, 2005. Our ﬁnal sample consists of 1926
takeover transactions.8In Uysal’s sample, underleveraged ﬁrms are 6% more likely to successfully acquire their target (P-value of 0.049). This result is
consistent with the implications of our model.
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Fig. 7. Deviation from target leverage. Panel A plots the dynamics of leverage deﬁcit of winning bidders around takeover announcements.
The sample period is 1980–2005.
E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2008) 556–581 573The leverage deﬁcit is deﬁned as the deviation from target leverage. Fitted values from the regression of
market leverage on the set of control variables described in Appendix B are used as a proxy for the target
leverage. The results are plotted in Fig. 7.
As shown in Fig. 7, the leverage deﬁcit of the winning bidders ﬁrst increases slightly in absolute terms from
year 3 to year 1 and then disappears in the year following takeover announcement. This pattern is
consistent with the model’s predictions. The shorter the time to the contemplated takeover transaction, the
larger its impact on valuation and therefore the larger the degree of leverage asymmetry between the winning
and the losing bidders. Because the losing bidder’s leverage is set based on the traditional trade-off between
tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs, it should be well approximated by the ﬁtted value from the target leverage
regression. The deviation of the winning bidder’s leverage from the target can then be interpreted as a measure
of asymmetry in capital structures of competing bidders.
4.2. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the interaction between ﬁnancial leverage and takeover activity. It develops a dynamic
model of takeovers in which the ﬁnancing strategies of the bidding ﬁrms and the timing and terms of takeovers
are jointly determined. In the paper, capital structure plays the role of a commitment device and determines
the outcome of the acquisition contest. We show that the possibility to grow externally through control
transactions generates an asymmetric equilibrium in ﬁnancing strategies, in which the bidder with the lowest
leverage wins the takeover contest. In equilibrium, the leverage ratio of the winning bidder is signiﬁcantly
lower than the leverage ratio that best balances bankruptcy costs with the tax beneﬁts of debt.
The model generates implications that are consistent with the available empirical evidence and yields a
number of new predictions. In particular, the model predicts that a bidder with the lower leverage is likely to
win in a takeover contest (unless the target ﬁrm is highly levered). Following the logic of the model, one would
also expect the winner of the contest to lever up after the takeover consummation. The model also relates the
dispersion in industry leverage ratios to various industry characteristics, such as the cash ﬂow volatility,
bankruptcy costs, and the state of the industry.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote the value of the bidder’s equity after the takeover by Ei;jðX ; ci;jÞ. In the region
for the industry shock where there is no default, the instantaneous change in the value of the equity satisﬁes
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rEi;jðX ; ci;jÞ ¼ ð1 tÞ½PjX  ci;j  þ mX
qEi;jðX ; ci;jÞ
qX
þ 1
2
s2X 2
q2Ei;jðX ; ci;jÞ
qX 2
. (22)
The solution of Eq. (22) is given by
Ei;jðX ; ci;jÞ ¼ AX x þ BX n þ ð1 tÞ
PjX
r m
ci;j
r
 	
, (23)
where x and n are the positive and negative roots of the equation 1
2
s2yðy 1Þ þ my r ¼ 0. In this paper, we
consider a stock based deﬁnition of default whereby shareholders inject funds in the ﬁrm as long as equity
value is positive. This condition implies that shareholders default on their debt obligations the ﬁrst time equity
value is equal to zero. As a result, the constants A and B together with the equity value-maximizing default
threshold Xj are determined through the set of boundary conditions:
Ei;jðXj ; ci;jÞ ¼ 0, (24)
qEi;jðX ; ci;jÞ
qX





X¼Xj
¼ 0; and (25)
lim
X!1
Ei;jðX ; ci;jÞ
X
oþ1. (26)
Simple algebraic derivations yield the desired result. &
Proof of Proposition 2. Our aim is to show that the maximum price that a bidding ﬁrm is willing to pay to
acquire the target, DEðX ; ci;bÞ, decreases with ci;b and increases with X. Replacing Xj by its expression in
Eq. (5) and using the fact that ci;o ¼ ci;b yields
DEðX ; ci;bÞ ¼ ð1 tÞ
Pm Po
r m X 
ctar
r
 A ci;m
Pm
ci;m
 n
þ ci;b
Po
ci;b
 n 	 
, (27)
where ci;m ¼ ci;b þ ctar and
A ¼ 1
rðn 1Þ
rðn 1ÞX
nðr mÞ
 	n
o0. (28)
The partial derivatives of DEðX ; ci;bÞ with respect to ci;b and X are:
qDEðX ; ci;bÞ
qci;b
¼  ð1 tÞð1 nÞA Pm
ci;m
 n
 Po
ci;b
 n 	
, ð29Þ
qDEðX ; ci;bÞ
qX
¼ ð1 tÞPm Po
r m
þ 1 t
r m
rðn 1ÞX
nðr mÞ
 	n1
ci;b
Po
 1n
 ci;m
Pm
 1n" #
. ð30Þ
Under the condition ctarPooci;bðPm PoÞ, we have qDEðX ; ci;bÞ=qci;bo0. In addition, the above analysis
makes sense only for X4Xo. Also, it follows from (30) that q
2DEðX ; ci;bÞ=q2Xo0. Therefore, it is sufﬁcient to
prove that
qDEðX ; ci;bÞ
qX





X¼Xo
40. (31)
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qDEðX ; ci;bÞ
qX





X¼Xo
¼ ð1 tÞPm Po
r m þ
1 t
r m 1
ci;mPo
ci;bPm
 1n" #
. (32)
The term in the square bracket is positive, which establishes the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that X 0 2 ðX 1;X Þ. In this region for the industry shock where there is no
default and no takeover, the instantaneous change in the value of the target’s equity satisﬁes
rEtarðX ; ctarÞ ¼ ð1 tÞðPtarX  ctarÞ þ E½dEtarðX ; ctarÞ, (33)
the solution to which is given by
EtarðX ; ctarÞ ¼ AX x þ BX n þ ð1 tÞ
PtarX
r m 
ctar
r
 
. (34)
To determine the values of A, B, and X , we use the boundary conditions for equity value at X 1 and X . Once
bidder 1 has defaulted, takeovers are precluded. As a result, the value of equity when X ¼ X 1 is
EtarðX ; ctarÞ



X¼X 1
¼ ð1 tÞ PtarX 1
r m 
ctar
r
þ ctar
rð1 nÞ
X 1
X tar
 n 
, (35)
where X tar is the default threshold selected by target shareholders deﬁned by
X tar ¼
n
n 1
ctarðr mÞ
Ptarr
. (36)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of this value-matching condition is the present value of a perpetual
entitlement to the current ﬂow of income. The second term represents the value of target shareholders’ option
to default. Because target shareholders do not choose the default threshold X 1, this value-matching condition
is not associated with a smooth-pasting condition. Consider next the choice of the takeover threshold X .
When X ¼ X , the value of equity satisﬁes the value-matching condition
EtarðX ; ctarÞ



X¼X ¼ DEðX ; ci;bÞ þ Z½DEðX ; cj;bÞ  DEðX ; ci;bÞ  K . (37)
Using Eqs. (35) and (37) and simple calculations, we get
A ¼ fDEðX ; ci;bÞ þ Z½DEðX ; cj;bÞ  DEðX ; ci;bÞ  KgX
n
1
X
x
X n1  X x1X
n

ð1 tÞ PtarX
r m 
ctar
r
 	
X n1 þ ð1 tÞ
ctar
rð1 nÞX
n X 1
X tar
 n
X
x
X n1  X x1X
n ð38Þ
and
B ¼ fDEðX ; ci;bÞ þ Z½DEðX ; cj;bÞ  DEðX ; ci;bÞ  KgX
x
1
X
n
X x1  X n1X
x

ð1 tÞ PtarX
r m 
ctar
r
 	
X x1 þ ð1 tÞ
ctar
rð1 nÞX
x X 1
X tar
 n
X
n
X x1  X n1X
x . ð39Þ
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EtarðX ; ctarÞ ¼ ð1 tÞ PtarX
r m 
ctar
r
 
þLðX ;X 1; yÞ
X 1
X tar
 n ð1 tÞctar
rð1 nÞ
HðX ;X 1; yÞ K þ ð1 tÞ
PtarX
r m 
ctar
r
  	
þHðX ;X 1; yÞfDEðX ; ci;bÞ þ Z½DEðX ; cj;bÞ  DEðX ; ci;bÞg. ð40Þ
This expression is valid for any takeover threshold X . Because the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side does not
depend on X , the threshold X is the solution to the following maximization problem:
X ¼ arg max
y
ð1 tÞLðX ;X 1; yÞ
X 1
X tar
 n
ctar
rð1 nÞ þHðX ;X 1; yÞF ðyÞ
 
. (41)
Proof of Proposition 5. The objective function of target shareholders, given by Eq. (7) can then be written as
Mðy; ci;bÞ ¼
yxX n  ynX x
yxX n1  ynX x1
X 1
X tar
 n
ctar
rð1 nÞ
þ X
xX n1  X nX x1
yxX n1  ynX x1
yðPb þ LPoÞ
r m 
K
1 t
 
þ X
xX n1  X nX x1
yxX n1  ynX x1
yn
rðn 1Þ
 ð1 ZÞ ci;b þ ctar
X nmðci;bÞ
 ci;b
X noðci;bÞ
 	
þ Z cj;b þ ctar
X nmðcj;bÞ
 cj;b
X noðcj;bÞ
 	 
. ð42Þ
Taking the partial derivative of the objective function with respect to y yields (after simpliﬁcations)
qMðy; ci;bÞ
qy
¼ X
xX n1  X x1X n
½yxX n1  ynX x12
fGðyÞ Dctarg, (43)
where
GðyÞ ¼ A½yxX n1ð1 xÞ þ ynX x1ðn 1Þ þ ðBþ CÞðn xÞynþx1X n1 D
K
1 t (44)
and A, B, C, and D are constants deﬁned by
A ¼ Pb þ LPo
r m 40, ð45Þ
B ¼ 1 Z
rð1 nÞ
rðn 1Þ
nðr mÞ
 	n
ð½ci;b þ ctar1nPnm  c1ni;b PnoÞ, ð46Þ
C ¼ Z
rð1 nÞ
rðn 1Þ
nðr mÞ
 	n
ð½cj;b þ ctar1nPnm  c1nj;b PnoÞ, ð47Þ
D ¼ nyb21X x1  xyx1X n1  E, ð48Þ
E ¼ y
nþx1ðn xÞ
rð1 nÞ
X 1
X tar
 n
. ð49Þ
Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition qMðy; ci;bÞ=qy ¼ 0 is satisﬁed for
KðyÞ ¼ ð1 tÞA½y
xX n1ð1 xÞ þ ynX x1ðn 1Þ þ ðBþ CÞðn xÞynþx1X n1  Ectar
D
. (50)
KðyÞ does not depend on the initial state of the stochastic shock, X. To prove that the correspondence KðyÞ is
one-to-one for sufﬁciently large K, it can be shown that
lim
y"1
qKðyÞ
qy
¼ ð1 tÞA x 1
x
40. (51)
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follows that there exists X XX sup such that KðyÞ40 is a one-to-one correspondence in the region
½X ;þ1Þ  ½KðX Þ;þ1Þ. &
Proof of Proposition 6 and 7. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4. &
Stock mergers: In this section we focus on the role of leverage in stock mergers, instead of cash offers.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that bidders submit bids as fractions of the equity of the combined entity that they are
willing to grant to target shareholders. The bidder with the highest bid value wins the takeover contest. We
argue that even though the negotiation mechanism of stock mergers is different from that of cash offers, the
main results of the previous section are valid for stock mergers as well.
Let f i be the fraction of the equity of the merged ﬁrm that is owned by bidder i’s shareholders i ði ¼ 1; 2Þ if
they win the takeover contest. Target shareholders then own a fraction of 1 f i. The value of the equity
holdings in the combined entity owned by bidder i is given by Proposition 1:
Ei;mðX ; ci;mÞ ¼ f ið1 tÞ
PmX
r m 
ci;m
r
 X
Xm
 n PmXm
r m 
ci;m
r
  	
, (52)
where ci;m ¼ ci;b þ ctar. Bidder i is indifferent between winning the takeover contest and becoming an outsider
if f i ¼ f i , where
f i Ei;mðX ; ci;mÞ ¼ Ei;oðX ; ci;oÞ. (53)
It is easy to check that if f i ¼ f i , then the bidder’s equity values coincide in these two scenarios. For any
fraction of equity f i exceeding f

i , bidder i is strictly better off by merging, while in the case f iof i , bidder 1
strictly prefers losing the takeover contest.
Target shareholders then hold a claim to the remaining shares of the merged ﬁrm. The value of this claim is
given by
ð1 f i ÞEi;mðX ; ci;mÞ
¼ ð1 tÞ xðPm PoÞ
r m 
ctar
r
 ci;b þ ctar
r n 1ð Þ
X
Xm
 n
þ ci;o
r n 1ð Þ
X
Xo
 n 	
. ð54Þ
This value is identical to the reservation value DEðX ; c1;bÞ given by Eq. (5). Thus, it does not matter whether
target shareholders are compensated in cash or in stock. In both cases, the mechanism of extracting premium
from the bidders is the same. The total value of the equilibrium premium accrued to target shareholders does
not depend on the form of compensation. The properties of the equilibrium premium, speciﬁed by Proposition
2, apply to the case of stock mergers as well. In particular, Proposition 2 establishes the monotonicity of the
acquisition price in ci;b for any given state of the stochastic shock X .
In stock offers, the value of the target’s holdings in the merged entity decreases with f i. On the contrary, the
value of a bidder’s holdings increases with f i. As long as this value exceeds the equity value of an outsider for
both bidders, they have an incentive to place a higher bid (offer a higher fraction of equity to target
shareholders). This incentive disappears for the bidder with the higher coupon (bidder 1) when f 1 ¼ f 1ðc1;bÞ.
The equilibrium strategy for bidder 2 is then to offer a fraction 1 bf 2 þ , where bf 2 is determined by matching
the reservation value of bidder 1 with the value of bidder 2’s bid:
ð1 f 1ÞE1;mðX ; c1;mÞ ¼ ð1 bf 2ÞE2;mðX ; c2;mÞ. (55)
In equilibrium, bidder 1 bids 1 f 1ðc1;bÞ and loses the takeover contest.
The above arguments imply that even though the negotiation mechanisms are different in the cases of cash
offers and stock mergers, the equilibrium value of the premium captured by the target is the same and is given
by Eq. (5). Because it is the value of the premium that determines the timing of the merger and the properties
of the equilibrium, all results obtained in the main text apply to the case of stock mergers as well.
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In this Appendix we perform exploratory tests of the model’s predictions. Our source for identifying control
transactions is the SDC US Mergers & Acquisitions database. We apply the following six ﬁlters to a
preliminary sample that begins on January 1, 1980 and ends on December 31, 2005 (1) The acquirer and the
target are public ﬁrms. (2) The acquirer’s ﬁnancial information is available in the Compustat annual tapes.
(3) We exclude transactions where the acquirer held more than 10% of the target’s stock prior to takeover
announcement. (4) The deal value is available form SDC and is at least $10 million. (5) The percent of shares
acquired in the deal is 50% or higher. (6) Financial ﬁrms [Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes 6000
and higher] are excluded.
Our ﬁnal sample consists of 1926 takeover transactions. Table A1 provides the descriptive statistics for our
sample of successful bidders as well as for the universe of all Compustat ﬁrms in the same sample period. We
speciﬁcally focus on market leverage, because most of our model predictions center around market leverage of
winning bidders in takeover contests. Market leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and
debt in current liabilities to the sum of long-term debt, debt in current liabilities and the total value of common
stock. (Our results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of market leverage.) The data for winning bidders are
obtained one year prior to takeover announcements.
The results reported in Table A1 show that winning bidders are on average larger ﬁrms with higher market-
to-book ratios. The market-to-book ratio is a typical empirical proxy for the value of a ﬁrm’s growth
opportunities. Therefore it is the growth ﬁrms that, on average, successfully acquire other companies. This
evidence is consistent with our model that predicts that ex ante identical ﬁrms follow asymmetric strategies:
One uses more debt and does not invest, while the other becomes a growth ﬁrm, uses less debt, and invests
(e.g. successfully accomplishes a takeover transaction). The evidence presented in Table A1 also supports the
major prediction of our model that the winning bidders are expected to be less levered before takeover
transactions than the losing ones (and other ﬁrms that do not participate in takeover contests).
While useful for illustrating purposes, the direct comparison of leverage ratios of ﬁrms within our sample
cannot be used for drawing any sound statistical inference, because of the differences in ﬁrm characteristics
over time and across industries. Different ﬁrms are likely to have different target leverage ratios. Therefore, to
measure the impact of takeovers on market leverage, we have to account for the set of potential determinants
of capital structure used in prior studies. This set includes proxies for size, growth opportunities, tangibility of
assets, costs of ﬁnancial distress, and proﬁtability. These determinants of capital structure are described below:
Size: Larger ﬁrms are considered to be more diversiﬁed and, therefore, less prone to bankruptcy. Thus,
leverage should be positively related to size. A common deﬁnition of size in the empirical capital structure
literature is the logarithm of a ﬁrm’s annual sales. To measure sales in constant dollars, we divide the nominal
sales by the consumer price index at the end of the respective year.
Regulation: Conﬂicts of interests between stockholders and debtholders are less severe in regulated
industries than in unregulated ones. Therefore, ﬁrms in regulated industries are expected to have higher
leverage ratios. We deﬁne railroads (SIC code 4011) before 1981, trucking (SIC codes 4210 and 4213) beforeTable A1
Firm characteristics Mean Median Standard deviation
Market leverage
All ﬁrms 0.258 0.185 0.254
Winning bidders 0.196 0.141 0.191
Market-to-book
All ﬁrms 1.76 1.10 2.21
Winning bidders 2.12 1.39 2.57
Size (log Sales)
All ﬁrms 9.08 9.07 2.35
Winning bidders 11.11 11.16 1.92
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gas and electric utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4939) as regulated.
Costs of financial distress: Consistent with the trade-off theory, Titman and Wessels (1988) ﬁnd a negative
relation between expected costs of ﬁnancial distress and leverage. Following Titman and Wessels, we deﬁne a
costly liquidation dummy that takes the value of one if a ﬁrm produces machines and equipment (SIC codes
3400-3999).
Tangibility: Tangible assets are easy to collateralize, and, therefore, they reduce the agency costs of debt. We
follow Rajan and Zingales (1995) in measuring tangibility as the ratio of ﬁxed to total assets.
Profitability: Based on different theories of optimal capital structure, a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability should be
negatively related to its leverage. We measure proﬁtability as the ratio of a ﬁrm’s operating income to its sales.
The evidence presented in Table A1 suggests that winning bidders are, on average, underlevered prior to
takeover transactions. To gauge the magnitude of this effect, we regress the market leverage of ﬁrms in our
sample on the set of control variables and a set of time dummies, equaling one if the ﬁrm becomes a successful
bidder in one, two, or three years or has recently completed a takeover deal. In order to control for industry
ﬁxed effects, we convert both dependent and independent variables into deviations from two-digit SIC
industry means. To get rid of extreme outliers and exclude zero-leverage ﬁrms, we windsorize observations in
the top and bottom 1% groups for both dependent and independent variables. Table A2 presents our results.
T-statistics are reported in brackets. The dummies BEFORE3, BEFORE2, and BEFORE1 are set to one if the
ﬁrm becomes a successful bidder in three, two, and one years, respectively. The dummies AFTER1 and
AFTER2 are set equal to 1 for ﬁrms that were successful acquirers in takeover deals announced in the previous
year (respectively two years ago).
Consistent with prior empirical studies, market leverage is negatively related to market-to-book ratio,
proﬁtability, and costs of ﬁnancial distress and positively related to tangibility, size, and regulation. In
addition, strong evidence suggests that winning bidders are underleveraged prior to takeover announcements
and that they increase leverage in the following year. The regression coefﬁcients on BEFORE3, BEFORE2,
and BEFORE1 are all negative and statistically signiﬁcant suggesting that on average successful bidders areTable A2
Regressions of market leverage on successful bidder dummies
Intercept 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
½17:91 ½18:05 ½18:20 ½17:20 ½17:13
Market-to-book 5:7 105 5:8 105 5:7 105 5:7 105 5:7 105
½1:95 ½1:99 ½1:95 ½1:94 ½1:95
Size 0.0078 0.0078 0.0078 0.0075 0.0075
½26:62 ½26:84 ½27:13 ½25:55 ½25:40
Proﬁtability 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
½15:41 ½15:42 ½15:42 ½15:42 ½15:41
Tangibility 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085
½57:60 ½57:55 ½57:33 ½57:75 ½57:76
Liquidation 0.0177 0.0177 0.0178 0.0178 0.0178
½12:90 ½12:91 ½12:94 ½12:97 ½12:97
Regulation 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
½5:76 ½5:74 ½5:74 ½5:78 ½5:78
BEFORE 3 0.059
½10:62
BEFORE 2 0.064
½12:06
BEFORE 1 0.068
½13:42
AFTER 1 0.00049
½0:09
AFTER 2 0.0070
½1:22
N 131,134 131,134 131,134 131,134 131,134
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E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2008) 556–581580underlevered by about 6–7%. This evidence is consistent with our predictions. The regression coefﬁcients on
AFTER1 and AFTER2 are statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the successful bidders increase their
leverage following takeovers and eliminate leverage deﬁcit.9References
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